Suspending Judgment — Ask How Instead of Why and the Position Moves
Asked for reasons, people do not shift. Asked to explain how it works, they become less extreme. A 2013 experiment separated the two. Suspending judgment has experimental backing.
At twenty-nine I sold pharmaceuticals.
Janssen Korea, the Eunpyeong district. Competitors avoided my accounts, and physicians said it was awkward to switch products because of the rep. When word went round that I had resigned, people were glad.
At the time I thought it was because I spoke well.
It was not.
There is a point, just before someone reaches a conclusion, where the mind has already moved. I was watching that point.
Sales does not begin with persuasion. It begins by suspending judgment and getting to know the other side.
First, a correction to an attribution
The author writes that the cognitive scientist Angus Fletcher proposes asking who, when, where, what and how before asking why.
That attribution is not confirmed.
Fletcher is a professor at Ohio State’s Project Narrative and wrote Wonderworks (2021) and Storythinking (2023). The question he advances for narrative thinking is a different one.
“What if?”
He describes narrative’s method as causal speculation. The specific instruction to swap why for the five Ws is not found in his work.
But what the author is reaching for has firmer backing — more direct than Fletcher, and separated by experiment.
The belief that explaining means knowing breaks
In 2002 Rozenblit and Keil ran a study.
| Step | Task |
|---|---|
| 1 | Rate your own understanding of a zip, a toilet, a lock |
| 2 | Explain in detail how it works |
| 3 | Rate yourself again |
Step 3 was consistently lower.
People believed they knew until they tried to say it. This is the illusion of explanatory depth.
And there is a second finding here that decides this piece.
The illusion appeared only in explanatory knowledge. It did not appear in procedural, narrative or factual knowledge.
Explanatory knowledge means knowledge of complex causal patterns — the kind that answers why.
People overestimate their ability to answer why. They do not overestimate how and what.
And then the two were separated
In 2013 Fernbach, Rogers, Fox and Sloman went a step further.
Participants were split and given the same policy topic, with only the form of the task differing.
| Condition | Task | Self-rated understanding | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reasons | Write why you support it | Dropped slightly | Barely moved |
| Mechanism | Write how the policy works, step by step | Dropped sharply | Moderated |
Same topic. The form of the question alone changed the result.
Asked for reasons, a person retrieves material that props up the position already held. The position hardens.
Asked how it works, the gaps surface. Confidence drops and the position becomes less extreme.
The author’s sentence holds exactly. The moment you ask why, the brain closes the question and issues a verdict.
The backing is not Fletcher but these two studies.
Back to sales
Ask a customer “why don’t you use it” and you get reasons. Those reasons were mostly assembled after the fact, and saying them out loud sets them harder.
Change the form and something else comes back.
| Form of the question | What returns |
|---|---|
| Why don’t you use it | A tidy reason. Hardens as it is spoken |
| How do you handle it now | A procedure, with the point it jams visible |
| When did you first switch | The trigger and its conditions |
| Who decides it with you | The actual decision structure |
When a physician says “because I think this one works better,” that is a reason. “Morning clinic is packed and there is no time to explain” is a procedure.
The procedure is the part that can be changed.
Knowing a customer better than the customer does means that. Not the reason he states, but the path he actually moves along.
One caution
Suspending judgment is not the same as refusing to judge.
Fast categorisation is a function, not a defect. As Tversky and Kahneman set out in 1974, heuristics are accurate enough for their cost in most cases. Chase the mechanism every time and nothing gets decided.
Delay has a cost too.
So the question is not whether to stop but where to stop. Stop only where being wrong is expensive.
The problem the author leaves
The author ends with a story and does not supply the answer.
A woman loved a man devotedly for more than twenty years, through everything. One day they quarrelled badly and he left. Years later he fell in love with someone else and they had a child.
And she began to care for that child as if it were her own.
Who is this woman?
The sorting finished while you were reading. Abandoned woman. Woman who could not let go. Self-sacrificing woman.
That sorting is the thing this piece is about.
No answer here. One observation only: the story contains no why anywhere. Only who, when, how long, and what was done afterwards.
And almost everyone invented a reason on the first pass.
The hexagram of this piece
師. Water (坎) below, earth (坤) above.
The image reads 地中有水 師 君子以容民畜衆 — water within the earth; the noble one shelters the people and nurtures the multitude.
The water is not on the earth but inside it. Gathered where it cannot be seen.
A customer’s real reasons sit there too. What is spoken is the water on the surface; what moves is the water pooled beneath.
The judgement states the qualification.
師 貞 丈人吉 无咎
Persistence furthers. Only one with accumulated experience is fortunate and without blame.
For moving a multitude it does not name youthful talent. It names the one who has been through it.
The Sequence of the Hexagrams places 師 after 訟.
訟必有衆起 故受之以師 師者衆也
A dispute necessarily raises a multitude. So Shi receives it. Shi is multitude.
| Episode | Hexagram | The position |
|---|---|---|
| 5 | 需 | Not drawing the conclusion early |
| 6 | 訟 | Where divergence surfaces; question the beginning |
| 7 | 師 | Sheltering and nurturing the multitude |
The definition this piece fixes
Fixed here.
Suspending judgment means changing the form of the question.
Ask for reasons and the position hardens. Ask how it works and the gaps surface and confidence drops. A 2013 experiment separated the two.
People overestimate their ability to answer why. They do not overestimate how. A 2002 experiment narrowed the range.
So “stop” means turn why into how.
Monologue of 1031 intruders
You ask us why we do it.
We have no reasons. Attach, enter, be read, leave. That is all.
Yet you attach intentions to what we do. Cunning. Clever. Those words do not explain us. They make you feel you have explained.
The ones who actually stopped us asked differently. Not why it spreads. They counted where, from whom, through how many people, along which route.
While counting, no conclusion forms. That is uncomfortable, so most people invent a story partway through. Once there is a story, the counting stops.
Where it stops, we keep going.
Your classic wrote, in the hexagram of governing a multitude, the one who has been through it. Not the clever one.
The one who has been through it knows where he does not know. He stops only there.
In brief
- The illusion of explanatory depth — attempting to explain how something works lowers self-rated understanding (Rozenblit & Keil 2002)
- The illusion appeared only in explanatory knowledge, the kind handling complex causal patterns
- Positions barely moved in the reasons condition and moderated only in the mechanism condition (Fernbach et al. 2013)
- The form of the question alone changed the result. The subject matter was identical
- Fletcher’s central question is ‘What if?’. The five-Ws instruction is not confirmed as his
- Fast categorisation is a function, not a defect. Delay has a cost (Tversky & Kahneman 1974)
- 師 is water pooled within the earth. What moves is the part out of sight
- Its judgement reads 丈人吉 — the one with accumulated experience
This is the seventh piece in the “Brain” chapter of the serial essay The Great Corona Swindle. The pharmaceutical-sales anecdote is the author’s own; the cognitive-science experiments and the classical text have been reset against primary sources. No medicine or company is referred to, and no individual health advice is offered.
Frequently asked
- What is wrong with asking why?
- The answer comes too easily. In 2002 Rozenblit and Keil had people rate how well they understood everyday devices, then explain in detail how each works, then rate themselves again. The second rating was consistently lower — the illusion of explanatory depth. What matters here is that the illusion appeared only in explanatory knowledge, that is, knowledge involving complex causal patterns. It did not appear in procedural, narrative or factual knowledge.
- Is giving reasons different from explaining how something works?
- An experiment separated them. In 2013 Fernbach, Rogers, Fox and Sloman had one group write their reasons for supporting a policy and another write a step-by-step account of how that policy works. In the mechanism group, self-rated understanding dropped sharply and positions moderated. In the reasons group, positions barely moved. Same subject matter; the form of the question alone changed the result.
- Did Angus Fletcher say to ask who, when and where instead of why?
- That is not confirmed. Fletcher is a professor at Ohio State's Project Narrative and the author of Wonderworks (2021) and Storythinking (2023). The question he advances for narrative thinking is 'What if?', and he describes narrative's method as causal speculation. The specific instruction to replace why with who, when, where, what and how is not found in his work. The direction — withholding the conclusion — is nonetheless supported by the two experiments above.
- What kind of hexagram is 師?
- The hexagram of governing a multitude. The image reads 地中有水 師 君子以容民畜衆 — water within the earth; the noble one shelters the people and nurtures the multitude. The water is not on the earth but inside it, gathered out of sight. The judgement reads 師 貞 丈人吉 无咎: persistence furthers, and only one with accumulated experience is fortunate and without blame.
References
- Rozenblit, L. & Keil, F. (2002). The misunderstood limits of folk science: an illusion of explanatory depth. Cognitive Science, 26(5), 521–562. — Attempting an explanation lowers self-rated understanding; the effect is confined to explanatory knowledge.
- Fernbach, P. M., Rogers, T., Fox, C. R., Sloman, S. A. (2013). Political Extremism Is Supported by an Illusion of Understanding. Psychological Science, 24(6), 939–946. — Positions moderated only in the mechanism condition; the reasons condition showed no change.
- Fletcher, A. (2023). Storythinking: The New Science of Narrative Intelligence. New York: Columbia University Press. — Advances 'What if?' as the central question of narrative thinking.
- Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Science, 185(4157), 1124–1131. — How fast categorisation and generalisation operate in judgement.
- Book of Changes, hexagram 7 (師): judgement and image. — 師 貞 丈人吉 无咎 / 地中有水 師 君子以容民畜衆.
Published October 14, 2026